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Overall, in 2012, the African continent received 
about US$61.1 billion in ODA and US$42.2 
billion in CPA. About two-thirds of this was 
direct bilateral assistance. This volume of CPA 
amounted to around 2.2% of gross African 
national income (GNI) in 2012.









om The problem with anything written about development aid particularly when it comes from 
hardened participants in its various 
guises is that it can descend into a 
series of anecdotes, each capping the 
last. (Uganda’s rabbit multiplication 
project? That’s nothing, remember the 
Bangladeshi paper mill…). Alternatively, 
it can rise into a cloud of generalised 
statements which only reinforce existing 
prejudices. In part this problem arises 
from the sheer diversity of the actions 
called development aid. In what frame 
is it possible to bring together, for 
example, the loan by the World Bank in 
2010 to the South African power utility, 
Eskom, of around US$3.75 billion as 
part of a $10 billion project to build 
4800 MW of coal-fired capacity, with 
the US$0.3 million spent by the Swedish 
International Development Agency 
between 2012-14 in Mozambique 
supporting a programme to improve 
institutional capability in areas such as 
gender-based violence? Let us start with 
some statistics.
The Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the OECD, an 
international grouping of 34 developed 
countries, defines official development 
assistance (ODA) as spending which 
has the "economic development and 
welfare of developing countries" as its 
primary objective. This can include 
some spending on refugees and 
students in donor countries, activities 
to build public support there for 
overseas development and the costs 
of administering aid programmes and 
debt relief, even though no new funds 
find their way to recipient countries. 
Approaching 20% of OECD aid is 
spent this way and the proportion can 
be much higher in the case of some EU 
countries.1 Much ODA is not a gift but 
a concessional loan, that is one below 
current market rates, and including a 
grant element of 25%. There has been 
some debate as to whether loan or grant 
aid is preferable. Current consensus, at 
least within the main agencies, is that 
concessional loans are to be preferred, 
repeating the view noted above that 
loans incentivise “policymakers to use 
funds wisely and to mobilize taxes or, 
at least, to maintain current levels of 
revenue collection. In contrast, grants 
are viewed as free resources and 
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could therefore substitute for domestic 
revenues”.2 
However, in the past, excessive 
loans could not be repaid and led to 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative, between 2000 and 2012 
which resulted in 35 countries having 
some $130 billion in pre-2003 debt 
written off. A recent paper by the Jubilee 
Debt Campaign argues that because of 
the very real risk of new debt crises 
being created in the developing world, 
urgent measures are needed to make 
lending more responsible and to create 
fair and transparent ways of dealing 
with debt crises if they do arise.3
ODA in 2013 by OECD countries 
amounted to $134.5 billion, about 
0.3% of their Gross National Income, a 
5.9% rise on the previous year but well 
below the 0.7% target recommended 
by the Pearson Commission in 1971. 
War-ravaged Afghanistan received 
by far the largest amount at just 
over $5 billion. Direct bilateral aid 
only accounts for about 70% of 
disbursement by OECD countries. 
The other 30% is filtered through 
multilateral agencies such as the World 
Bank group or used inside the donor 
countries thus obscuring the overall 
regional and country income. However 
it is significant that over 36% of 
allocated aid goes to what are classified 
as ‘middle-income’ countries, whilst 
just 32% is distributed to low income 
states. The top five recipient countries 
are all Asian (Afghanistan, Myanmar, 
Vietnam, India and Indonesia) whilst 
Kenya, Tanzania, Cote d’Ivoire and 
Ethiopia in that order are the next most 
important with Kenya receiving $2 
billion and Ethiopia nearly $1.9 billion. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the largest region 
receiving aid, with 26.9% of the total, 
south and central Asia receiving 16.9%.
The DAC has made some effort to 
strip out those elements of ODA which 
are not passed directly on to recipient 
states: debt relief, humanitarian aid, 
in-donor costs, aid through NGOs, 
and spending that is not allocated to 
specific countries. It calls this ‘country 
programmable aid’ (CPA) reducing 
the total of $134 billion noted above 
to only US$56.9 billion. Significantly, 
Africa as a whole receives only 38% of 
this CPA, amounting to $21.7 billion, 
whilst Asia receives nearly 45.6%., 
reflecting both the huge volume of 
‘aid’ pumped directly into Afghanistan, 
largely by the USA, and African 
countries as the largest recipients of 
debt relief, the latter allowing for a 
subtle form of double-counting: aid 
one year in the form of concessionary 
loans and aid a few years later when 
the same debt is written off. As well as 
Afghanistan, six other Asian countries 
also rank in the top ten recipients of 
CPA: the proportion of CPA directed 
to middle-income countries was 53% 
against 41% or US$23.4 billion, going 
to low-income states.
Fig.1: Official Development Aid and Country Programme Aid as a proportion of national income in African countries
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Overall, in 2012, the African 
continent received about US$61.1 
billion in ODA and US$42.2 billion 
in CPA. About two-thirds of this was 
direct bilateral assistance. This volume 
of CPA amounted to around 2.2% of 
gross African national income (GNI) in 
2012. It is interesting that the volume 
of CPA received by Asian countries that 
year was roughly equal to that of Africa 
at US$39.9 billion but only formed 
0.3% of the latter’s GNI. 
The impact relative to national 
income does vary as can be seen in Fig. 
1. For example, Malawi is recorded 
as receiving US$1.2 billion of ODA 
in 2012 amounting to 28% of GNI 
whilst Liberia received aid amounting 
to 36% of its GNI. However, these 
are exceptional countries; the normal 
proportion of GNI for most lower-
income African countries is below 10%. 
Fig 2 shows the proportion of ODA to 
poorer African countries plotted against 
GNI/capita. (Countries with a GNI/
capita greater than $2500 have been 
omitted).  It shows that, although the 
very poorest receive a slightly higher 
proportion of ODA, overall there is 
no obvious relationship. Overall, ODA 
forms a very important component of 
external resource flows into Africa, as 
shown in Fig. 3, amounting to 38%, 
with remittances accounting for 24% 
and comfortably exceeding direct 
investment at 13%. 
Finally, the role of China in aid 
to Africa has been much debated in 
recent years. China does not provide 
any figures to the DAC on its overseas 
aid programme though it has recently 
started to provide some of its own 
statistics. These do not always conform 
to the definitions of the DAC and so 
comparable numbers are hard to find. 
One detailed study4 suggested that, in 
2009, Chinese disbursement in Africa 
(the DAC measure) amounted to 
about US$1.4 billion. The DAC itself 
estimates that, worldwide, in 2013, 
China disbursed bilaterally or through 
multilateral agencies US$5.9 billion. 
Therefore, Chinese direct aid amounted 
to less than 4% of total OECD direct 
aid, though the Chinese efforts may be 
targeted at fewer countries. China has 
recently been instrumental in setting 
up the Asia Infrastructure Investment 
Bank which some have seen as a rival 
to the World Bank and associated 
institutions and which may offer loans 
on a concessional basis. 
The Debate on Foreign Aid:  Is it 
necessary and does it work?
Development aid has always had 
vocal critics both on the right and the 
left. From the very beginning in 1971, 
on the free-market right, Bauer argued 
that aid was ‘plain charity’ and really 
had nothing to do with development.5 
Countries that needed capital because 
of low savings potential should borrow 
on capital markets, ensuring loans 
were productive and repayable. 
Governments could borrow to build 
roads or railways or other parts of 
social and economic infrastructure 
and repay from the additional tax 
Fig 2: Official Development Aid as a proportion of Gross National Income in poorer African countries
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revenue following increased economic 
activity. Even aid for ‘the relief of need’ 
is rejected as the definition of ‘need’ 
differs between underdeveloped and 
developed countries, and could be 
the consequence of poor decisions by 
the recipient  governments – excessive 
military spending for example. Aid 
often served geopolitical purposes but 
he argued that these might be better 
served by a ‘military presence in the 
recipient country’.  For Bauer, there 
are really no circumstances under 
which aid is justified. Modelling foreign 
aid on the post-second world war 
Marshall Plan was an error: this was aid 
to ‘restore’ ravaged economies, not to 
develop them. 
From the left aid was seen as 
a neo-colonial project (especially 
where it was tied to the purchase of 
inputs from donor country firms) and 
unnecessary as the quantity of foreign 
resources that needed to be mobilised 
could be effected by a reduction in 
import consumption by the domestic 
higher income groups thus releasing 
foreign exchange for importing the 
equipment necessary to industrialise. 
Aid’s geopolitical role was powerfully 
critiqued by Teresa Hayter, whose 
study6 of World Bank and other 
international institutions’ aid to Latin 
America argued that it was used by 
these agencies, and the capitalist 
countries that controlled them, to 
influence recipient government 
policies in such a way as to maintain 
the interests of capitalism and prevent 
the further spread of communist 
regimes. Not for nothing at that time 
was the largest chunk of aid going 
to South Vietnam. ‘Leverage’, the 
use of the power to lend to force 
recipients to pursue specific policies, 
became better known in the 1980s as 
‘conditionality’ and was very publicly 
written into loan agreements part of 
‘structural adjustment’ programmes, 
the implementation of which was a 
condition for both development aid 
and balance of payments support 
from the World Bank  and the IMF 
respectively. 
In between these two views were 
those who believed aid could be 
effective, as had been demonstrated in 
the case of countries that had received 
large amounts of aid allowing sustained 
growth and eventually requiring no 
aid.7 The case for development aid 
was reinforced over two decades 
by the Commissions headed by 
Pearson (1969)8, Brandt (1981)9, 
and Brundtland (1987)10 on the basis 
of mutual interests of developed 
and developing countries. Pearson 
addressed the ‘widening gap’ between 
them: ‘the central issue of our time’, 
and the growing disenchantment 
with aid, especially the mistrust as 
to donors’ motives and recipients’ 
ability to use aid productively. Aid 
augmented scarce domestic resources 
for investment, was necessary, 
and needed to be substantially 
increased. The Commission famously 
recommended that the volume of aid 
should be raised from the then average 
of 0.39% of developed country GDP to 
0.7% by 1975 and no later than 1980. 
This target has yet to be reached by 
most industrialised countries. 
These arguments continued 
throughout the 1970s but the pro-aid 
lobby prevailed. Donor country 
governments expanded their efforts, 
NGOs expanded and proliferated, and 
the international institutions became 
more active and powerful. Debates 
continued, and studies appeared 
defending aid,11  or directly asking 
whether it worked and if it didn’t, 
how it could be made to work.12 The 
general view was that although there 
were problems and bad decisions, aid 
did more good than harm and that the 
important thing was to discover why it 
worked in some cases and not in others 
rather than to make blanket statements 
about aid in general.
However, critiques of aid also 
continued. Easterly13 argued that aid 
in the form of typically grandiose plans 
and projects had done little good and 
a lot of harm though specific kinds 
of aid did work. The problem was 
western intervention, whether from 
the World Bank, Live Aid, the Gates 
Foundation and other grand efforts 
to ‘make poverty history’, or military 
intervention that has sought regime 
change. He distinguishes between 
Planners, who advocate aid and have 
development plans to make use of 
it, and Searchers who find and take 
opportunities in markets. Planners 
have ‘good intentions, but don’t 
motivate anyone to carry them out’: 
for example, after all those billions of 
aid dollars, neither ‘12 cent medicines’ 
nor ‘four dollar mosquito nets’ have 
been provided to the poor to combat 
malaria. Searchers on the other hand, 
find out about markets and what is 
likely to be in demand at affordable 
prices and produce accordingly: JK 
Rowling, ‘a single mother on welfare 
without a plan or an International 
Financing Facility’, took the chance 
to write the Harry Potter series which 
made her fortune. 
Aid agencies have failed to deliver 
their big targets, as with the Millennium 
Development Goals. The aid that does 
work is from Searchers: the agency that 
got bed nets to those with an incentive 
to use them – pregnant mothers at ante-
natal clinics, thus reaching the main risk 
groups for malaria, pregnant mothers 
and children under five. Costing 50 
cents each with the nurse getting nine 
cents for each net, an incentive to 
ensure the nets are always in stock. They 
are also sold to better off Malawians at 
five dollars each, thus subsidising the 
cheaper nets for the poor. According 
to Easterly, this is aid that works in 
comparison to handing out free nets to 
everyone when only a small proportion 
get used. In effect foreign aid that 
doesn’t use market mechanisms will not 
work well and will be wasted. 
More recently, the Zambian 
economist Dambisa Moyo published 
Dead Aid.14 A graduate of Oxford and 
Harvard universities, a World Bank 
consultant and former employee of 
Goldman Sachs, she dedicates her 
book to Bauer and follows much of 
his reasoning. Aid is always a market 
distortion, causing a vicious circle of low 
growth, persistent poverty, corruption, 
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low savings, and low investment back 
to low growth, prevents the spread of 
entrepreneurship, causes civil wars 
(often about competition among 
different ethnic groups for food aid). 
Inflows of aid overvalue exchange rates 
encouraging imports and reducing 
incentives to export. Countries which 
have received aid and done well have 
done so because aid was very small. 
As to why donors continue aid if 
it is so ineffective, Moyo argues that 
apart from the political, economic 
and moral considerations, the 
livelihoods of thousands of people 
employed by the donor agencies and 
development ministries depend on the 
dispensing of aid, and by implication, 
the perpetuation of the dependency 
relationship with the donors. 
Moyo’s solutions involve African 
countries establishing stock markets, 
using bond markets to raise investment 
funds, spreading the risk to investors 
by seeking loans collectively 
through for example, the Pan-Africa 
Infrastructure Development Fund 
(PAIDF), encouraging micro-finance 
for small agricultural and industrial 
producers, reducing the transfer costs 
of remittances, encouraging Foreign 
Direct Investment, and fostering 
trade both with developed countries 
and within Africa. As with the Asian 
emerging economies, once countries 
show they are open to business and 
mean business, their credit scores 
rise and they can get loans cheaper 
than before. This is easier to achieve 
if a country is resource rich, but it is 
also possible in cases where countries 
are resource poor, especially if they 
can pool risk through collective 
borrowing. As for investment and 
trade, relations with China are leading 
the way in infrastructural development, 
manufacturing investment and 
commodity trade: China exchanges 
what Africa can offer with what it can 
offer Africa.
The issue with all these critics, both 
from the left and the right, is that they all 
proceed, ideologically, from idealised 
worlds, either ones free of capitalism or 
with some form of free market which 
are then warped by the intrusion of 
aid. None, and this is particularly true 
of Moyo, can cope with the hard facts 
of reality; that idealised free markets 
are just an imaginary construct of 
economics textbooks. Aid for better or 
worse has to find its way through the 
maze of the real world.
Finally, there is an account of aid15 
arguing both sides in the context of 
Tanzania’s economic history. On the 
one hand, in spite of pursuing socialist 
policies that did not work, Tanzania 
continued to receive large amounts of 
aid from donors to support those very 
policies: ‘toxic aid’ that impoverished 
the country by encouraging ‘misguided 
policies, blunders, [and] growing 
corruption’ and heavily outweighed 
the benefits from ‘socially worthwhile 
projects’, mainly in education and 
health. In this story, it was only 
when the  donors reversed policy 
from ‘toxic aid’ to the ‘tough love’ 
of conditionality, that eventually 
Tanzania reformed, achieved growth 
rates among the highest in Africa and 
aid began to work. This view places 
the responsibility on donors to exert 
leverage on recipients so that aid can 
be effective with the ‘right’ domestic 
policies which are ‘owned’ by the 
recipients. This continues to be the 
strategy of the donors, led by the World 
Bank, to whose record we now turn. 
The World Bank
The 30% of OECD aid, or $39 billion 
annually, that is provided to multilateral 
agencies plus funds supplied for 
‘earmarked’ projects puts the share 
of multilateral agencies in gross ODA 
at around 40%. There are over 200 of 
these agencies according to the DAC, 
mostly under the UN umbrella, the 
most important single agencies being 
the World Bank Group, the European 
Union, the UN and, to a lesser extent, 
the two largest regional development 
banks of Africa and Asia. The largest 
of these is the UN group though as a 
single, multilateral agency the EU leads 
providing around $12.5 billion in core 
funding. (Including earmarked funds, 
the World Bank Group comes top).16 
In Africa, the EU is comfortably ahead 
providing 14% of the $51 billion net 
disbursement against the 9% provided 
by its International Development 
Agency (IDA) wing.17
However, in terms of influence, 
the World Bank is the dominant force 
in all aspects of development aid. As 
Sender argues in his critical appraisal 
of the role of the Bank in Africa, it 
“together with the IMF, has achieved 
a great deal of influence on the 
disbursements made by bilateral and 
multilateral donors; it has often been 
the case that non-Washington donors 
will not disburse aid to a sub-Saharan 
African country until that country has 
signed agreements with the Bank and 
the IMF.”18 Hence the World Bank is 
the main focus for left-wing critiques of 
ODA because of its espousal of free-
market economic policies.
The Bank has developed into 
something of a hydra-headed monster 
with five distinct parts; the IDA, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), which 
together constitute the World Bank 
as such. Add to this the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA) and the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment 
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Disputes (ICSID), all of which have 
been set up to assist the private sector 
in developing countries: none meet 
the DAC criteria for development aid. 
Neither does the IBRD, as its role in 
Africa is extremely limited with new 
loans to sub-Saharan Africa of just 
$42 million from a world-wide total 
of $15.2 billion in 2013. The IDA is 
financed largely by donor contributions 
through loan repayments and a small 
volume of transfers from the IBRD.
All ODA is political, an intervention 
by one sovereign state or quasi-
sovereign agency in the affairs of 
another. However, the political role of 
the World Bank is often rather larger 
than that of most other development 
agencies. Set up as the IBRD at the 
Bretton Woods conference in 1946 as 
the IMF’s partner to aid reconstruction 
in Europe, its first loan was to France 
in 1947. It provided $250 million, 
the biggest in real terms ever granted, 
on condition that the loan received 
primacy in repayment over all other 
external debts and that Communist 
ministers in the then government be 
dismissed. This condition came via the 
US State Department whose views on 
other countries have remained crucial 
to World Bank approval. 
Thus after the Egyptian government 
agreed to Soviet finance for the Aswan 
Dam project in 1956, Bank loans 
ceased until 1974. Vietnam in the 
1970s and 1980s and Iran after 1979 
were also frozen out of Bank largesse. 
In 2000, one of us worked on a Bank 
project analysing ways to export gas 
from Turkmenistan to Europe. The 
obvious route was through Iran to 
whom Turkmenistan already exported 
gas. However, even a visit to the 
country was rejected although Iran was 
a member of the Bank, apparently in 
good standing. A further example of US 
influence on the Bank is that Cuba is 
not a member and has never received 
any project aid.
Explicit embargoes on countries in 
line with US foreign policy was a blunt 
instrument and relatively rarely used 
in the years when the Bank’s main 
activity consisted mostly of loans for 
infrastructure projects. However, in the 
1980s there developed an emphasis 
on wider development projects and a 
greater level of conditionality associated 
with loans, increasingly based upon 
the neo-liberal economics then coming 
into favour under Reagan and which 
crystallised in the form of the so-called 
‘Washington consensus’ associated 
with policies of opening up markets, 
free movement of capital, privatisation 
and ’rolling back’ the state. It is rather 
ironic that the vehement criticism 
from the right, outlined earlier, largely 
reduces to claims, noted above, that 
ODA is inimical to just these aims. 
Though there has been some shift from 
its most ideological period in the 1990s 
into this century, partly following 
sustained criticism from former Bank 
Chief Economist, Joseph Stiglitz, and 
others of similar eminence and partly 
because such policies, particularly in 
Africa, have not had positive results 
in promoting economic growth, the 
Washington Consensus still govern the 
broad outlines of the Bank’s work. One 
significant moment in this shift was the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 in which 
the IMF’s role was subsequently sharply 
criticised and in which countries, 
especially Malaysia, which refused IMF 
conditionality, suffered rather less than 
those which accepted. 
The World Bank is more than a 
lender. In Sender’s words, the Bank 
has established a hegemonic position as 
the dominant source of economic and 
policy analysis for sub-Saharan Africa…
Most donors to, and governments 
in, sub-Saharan Africa must rely on 
economic and other statistical data 
collated, processed or collected by 
the Bank in formulating development 
policy.”19  The scale of the Bank’s efforts 
in the area of research and analysis is 
vast and impossible to summarise. To 
take random examples: under ‘M’ in 
the country index, one can find 119 
publications on Malawi and 55 under 
Mali whilst under ‘S’ there are 102 
for Senegal, 67 for Sierra Leone and 
13 for Sao Tome and Principe. This 
array of research reports are additional 
to the regular statistical bulletins used 
widely as authoritative sources of 
both macroeconomic and micro data, 
often unobtainable from the statistical 
agencies in individual countries.
The quality of this research varies 
widely from excellent through to bad 
and just invented. This may not matter 
much, one way or another, as most 
users learn discretion. What matters is 
that this huge volume of information 
(knowledge services in Bank-speak), 
creates the impression of an institution 
whose opinions on country or regional 
policy have to be accepted as the best 
there is. Such efforts do not come 
cheap. Administrative costs of the 
Group come to about $3.6 billion 
including a rather astonishing $339 
million spent on travel in 2013. 
Although not directly responsible 
for ODA, the International Finance 
Corporation is the part of the World 
Bank Group that directly finances 
private sector bodies in developing 
countries. Created in 1956, the IFC 
remained dependent upon World Bank 
funding until 1984 when it achieved 
financial and legal independence, 
raising funds through bond issues. Now 
with a global portfolio of somewhat 
above $50 billion, about 15% of which 
is in sub-Saharan Africa, it invested $4.7 
billion in the region in 2013. In 2000, 
just 13% of the group’s total spending 
was allocated to the IFC, but by 2013 
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that figure had soared to 35%. The IFC 
has grown so rapidly that it now forms 
half of the World Bank Group.
The IFC recently came in for severe 
criticism from a group of NGOs led by 
Oxfam: 
The private sector arm of the 
WBG, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) invested $36bn 
in financial intermediaries, which 
include commercial banks, private 
equity and hedge funds, in the four 
years leading up to June 2013. …. 
investment in the financial sector 
outstrips WBG lending to important 
social sectors: totalling 50 percent 
more than direct lending to health, 
and three times the amount the 
WBG lent directly to education in the 
same period. Meanwhile, criticisms 
about this model of financing and 
the human and environmental costs 
it entails have grown. 
The report provides several 
examples which demonstrate that 
IFC lending through financial 
intermediaries has in numerous 
cases had significant and long-term 
detrimental impact on already 
vulnerable communities. At the 
core, the concerns of affected 
communities and civil society go 
beyond just technical fixes, and 
relate to fundamental questions 
about the development impact 
rationale for the IFC's investments in 
financial intermediaries.”  
Natalie Bugalski, legal director of 
Inclusive Development International 
and a co-author of the report, recently 
said: IFC’s lending to third parties is 
now so huge, its portfolio so shrouded 
in darkness and riddled with abuse, that 
it needs to completely overhaul this 
lending model.”20 
This criticism could be applied to 
the entire World Bank Group though 
the complaints against the IFC are 
particularly shocking. Sometimes 
criticism is misplaced. Along with other 
agencies, the Bank certainly lends to 
large projects, in particular dams and 
hydrocarbon pipelines, which damage 
the environment and may cause social 
problems.
Two African projects which have 
been particularly criticised in this 
respect are the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project and the Chad-Cameroon 
Oil Pipeline. Just Phases 1A/B of the 
former cost around US$3.5 billion 
whilst the latter cost some US$3.7 
billion; both required substantial 
resources from a number of agencies 
including the World Bank; and in 
both cases, it seems that significant 
numbers of local people displaced 
by development have received little 
direct benefit. It should be borne in 
mind, however, that such complaints 
are nearly always levelled against 
such projects throughout the world 
in both rich as well as poor countries 
and the final decision on them lies 
with sovereign governments and not 
financing institutions. 
The Lesotho project saw a number 
of corruption cases before the Lesotho 
courts and there is no doubt that 
similar problems arise in countries 
with less open judiciaries. However 
financial transactions of many kinds 
and involving many regimes are 
accompanied by corruption, such 
as Middle East arms sales. The Bank 
along with other agencies are clearly 
faced with an acute dilemma. Should 
they assist projects which will help the 
poor in a particular country or should 
they draw back, knowing that however 
tight the financial control, some of 
the funds will be diverted into private 
government pockets?
In the end, the central criticism of 
the World Bank is that it is too big, has 
too many functions and has taken over 
a role both as a dominant ‘information 
bank’ as well as a financial bank. 
Few countries, particularly in Africa, 
are able to stand up to the Bank and 
its neo-liberal free-market policies 
despite overwhelming evidence 
that they do not aid development. 
The most conspicuous examples of 
successful development in Asia are 
precisely the ones which did not 
follow the Washington rules. Perhaps 
the most succinct commentary against 
Bank policies came when one of us 
was part of a World Bank mission to 
China and attended a small meeting 
between the French head of the Bank’s 
power division and a senior official 
in the Chinese energy ministry. After 
a long introduction from the Bank 
representative, there was a long silence 
and the official briefly responded 
in Chinese. Amidst smothered 
embarrassed giggles from his staff, 
the translation came: “I see that you 
have come from Washington with 
your mouth, Monsieur, but have left 
your ears behind”. There is indeed still 
much listening and learning to be done 
by donors and recipients if aid is to be 
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